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BLOCKCHAIN: POST-QUANTUM SECURITY &
LEGAL ECONOMICS
BRIAN SEAMUS HANEY *
ABSTRACT
Blockchain technology is subject to security vulnerabilities
resulting from recent developments in quantum computing and
cryptography. All the while, the technical complexities of blockchain’s
peer-to-peer system require the intervention of third-party intermediaries
to facilitate financial transactions across blockchain networks. Current
legal scholarship describes blockchain technology as a peer-to-peer
system without a central authority, supporting the secure
decentralization of economies and financial markets. Yet, with
consideration to recent advancements in quantum computing, blockchain
technology is not secure. Further, the technology’s legality is subject to
the will of the central authorities whose economic systems it seeks to
decentralize.
This Article contributes the first post-quantum analysis of the
intersection of blockchain security and law. Additionally, this is among
the first pieces of legal scholarship to analyze the complex relationships
between Congress, the Federal Reserve, and blockchain technology in
the creation of money. In doing so, this article challenges conventional
assumptions relating to blockchain technology’s decentralizing
economic impact. Ultimately, this article takes an interdisciplinary
approach—drawing on informatics, law, and economics scholarship—to
argue blockchain fails to provide a legal or secure means of establishing
a peer-to-peer payment system.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
* J.D., Notre Dame Law School; B.A., Washington & Jefferson College. Special thanks to
Angela Elias, Joel M. Gottlieb, Eleanor Rieffel, Zhihui Wang, C. Steven Bradford, Richard
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Dr. Bryan Jacobs, Amir Kalev, Mehdi Bozzo-Rey, Max Tegmark, Maria Munoz-Robles,
Brian Bodine, and Steve Adachi. Your thoughts, comments, and constructive criticisms made
this piece possible, and I am sincerely grateful.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Conventional wisdom teaches that technological progress is
driven by the Law of Accelerating Returns (“LOAR”). 1 The LOAR’s
application to information technology, Moore’s Law, projects
exponential trends in technological progress toward an ultimate
technological singularity. 2 This notion has developed into a school of
thought called Technological Utopianism. 3 Technological Utopianism
refers to the idea that digital life is the natural and desirable next step in
the cosmic evolution of humanity, which will certainly be good. 4 As a
result of Technological Utopianism, a majority of technology literature is
inherently optimistic, both in terms of outcomes and rates of progress.
For example, Oxford Professor Nick Bostrom suggests exponential
increases in artificial intelligence technologies will soon lead to
superintelligent machines. 5 In addition, Google’s Ray Kurzweil argues
the technological singularity—the time at which the human brain is
reverse engineered with computational technologies—is only a decade
away. 6 The optimism surrounding blockchain technology is no exception
to this trend.
On November 1, 2008, an unknown person with the pseudonym
Satoshi Nakamoto sent an email to a cryptography mailing list to
announce he had produced a “new electronic cash system that’s fully
peer-to-peer, with no trusted third party.” 7 Later that year, Nakamoto
published the Bitcoin White Paper, which serves as the foundation of
blockchain technology. 8 According to Twitter Founder and CEO Jack
Dorsey, the Bitcoin White Paper is a seminal work in computer science. 9
1. MURRAY SHANAHAN, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SINGULARITY 158-159 (2015). See also
Brian S. Haney, The Perils and Promises of Artificial General Intelligence, 45 J. LEGIS. 151,
155 (2018) (noting that the term LOAR is generally attributed to Ray Kurzweil, describing the
application of Moore’s Law to information technology.)
2. RAY KURZWEIL, HOW TO CREATE A MIND 250 (2012).
3. See Eleanor Lumsden, The Future is Mobile: Financial Inclusion and Technological
Innovation in The Emerging World, 23 STAN. J.L. BU. & FIN. 1, 5 (2017) (arguing the best
hope for eradicating poverty is technological innovation).
4. MAX TEGMARK, LIFE 3.0 BEING HUMAN IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 32
(2017).
5. NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES 34 (2017).
6. KURZWEIL, supra note 2, at 261.
7. SAIFEDEAN AMMOUS, THE BITCOIN STANDARD xv (2018).
8. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System 1 (2008),
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E6J-FADD]
9. DealBook 2017: Squaring off with Jack Dorsey, N.Y. TIMES CONFS. (2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MNHoyGW7YOU [https://perma.cc/5R9F-YBGQ].
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In the Bitcoin White Paper, Nakamoto presents a problem:
“Commerce on the Internet has come to rely almost exclusively on
financial institutions serving as trusted third parties to process electronic
payments.” 10 Nakamoto claims what is needed is an electronic payment
system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust, allowing any two
willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a
trusted third party. 11 However, for transactions in such a system to be
valid there must be a way in which to verify electronic coins are not spent
twice. 12 In other words, the payee must be able to know the previous
owners did not already spend the electronic coin. 13 Thus, Nakamoto
proposes a solution using “a peer-to-peer distributed timestamp server to
generate computational proof of the chronological order of
transactions.” 14 Nakamoto’s answer has come to be known as a
blockchain. 15
This Article takes an informatics-based approach, 16 arguing
Technological Utopianism and its influence on public perceptions of
blockchain technology are misguided due to the technology’s postquantum security vulnerabilities. Further, this article takes a contrarian
position, drawing on law and economics scholarship to discuss
constitutional, criminal, and regulatory issues relating to blockchain
technology. Part II describes blockchain technology in detail, using
Bitcoin for illustrative examples. 17 Part III introduces quantum
computing and identifies two post-quantum security vulnerabilities for
blockchain technology. 18 Part IV discusses cryptocurrency and its
constitutionality, as well as theories of economic regulation relating to
blockchain technology. 19 Ultimately, this Article argues blockchain
technology is not a revolutionary innovation and its future impacts on
economic markets will be de minimis. 20

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Nakamoto, supra note 8, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 1.
Riley T. Svikhart, Blockchain’s Big Hurdle, 70 STAN. L. REV. 100, 101 (2017).
Informatics is a field of study involving information processing and engineering.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
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II. BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY
Blockchains are decentralized databases maintained by
distributed networks of computers. 21 Scholars, industry leaders, and
commentators rave about blockchain technology. 22 For example, Harvard
scholar, Primavera De Filippi, argues “[b]lockchain technology
constitutes a new infrastructure for the storage of data and the
management of software applications, decreasing the need for centralized
middlemen.” 23 Further, prominent Silicon Valley entrepreneur and
venture capitalist Marc Andreessen claims that “Bitcoin at its most
fundamental level is a breakthrough in computer science—one that builds
on 20 years of research into cryptographic currency, and 40 years of
research in cryptography, by thousands of researchers around the
world.” 24 At its core, a blockchain is simply a distributed ledger that can
record transactions between parties. 25 In other words, blockchain
technology constitutes an infrastructure for the storage of data and the
management of software applications. 26
A.

Network Structure

The design of a blockchain network consists of a series of
computers, called nodes, connected via the internet, where each node
maintains a record of transactions, called the ledger. 27 Blockchain
technology’s network structure is a parasitic function of the internet. The
Internet’s original structure involved two layers: (1) the Transmission
Control Protocol, to manage the assembly of packets into messages and
ensure that the original message was received, and (2) the Internet
21. PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF
CODE 13 (2d ed. 2018). See also Ashley N. Longman, The Future of Blockchain: As
Technology Spreads, it May Warrant More Privacy Protection for Information Stored with
Blockchain, 23 N.C. BANKING INST. 111, 118-119 (2019).
22. See generally Kelsey L. Penrose, Banking on Bitcoin: Applying Anti-Money
Laundering and Money Transmitter Laws, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 529, 529 (2014).
23. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 21 at 33.
24. Marc Andreessen, Why Bitcoin Matters, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2014, 11:54 AM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/why-bitcoin-matters/
[https://perma.cc/NM5G447Z].
25. Nick Webb, A Fork in The Blockchain: Income Tax and The Bitcoin/Bitcoin Cash
Hard Fork, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 283, 284 (2018).
26. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 33.
27. David Mills et al., Distributed Ledger Technology in Payments, Clearing, and
Settlement 10 (Fed. Res. Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 95, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/UUU6-R2SY].
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Protocol to pass packets from one node to another. 28 As the internet has
evolved, contemporary models of the internet are composed of five
layers 29:
1. The physical layer includes all the hardware
necessary for a machine to transfer information to and
from the internet. 30
2. The data link layer comprises all protocols including
ethernet and Wi-Fi systems that interface with the
hardware connected to the internet. 31
3. The network layer is governed by the internet
protocol (“IP”) and is considered the glue holding the
internet together because it refers to computers
connected via the internet which are assigned unique
IP addresses helping data navigate across the
network. 32
4. The transport layer is primarily governed by the
Transmission Control Protocol (“TCP”) and User
Datagram Protocol (“UDP”) ensuring data packets
are sent through to the network layer properly. 33
5. The application layer sits on top of the TCP/IP stack,
consisting of a set of protocols enabling people to
share information, swap messages, transfer files, or
resolve domain names into their corresponding IP
addresses. 34
Blockchain networks, like Bitcoin, ultimately rely on TCP and IP
to operate and can be viewed as application protocols resting on top of
the transport layer. 35 Blockchain users each have a unique address for
identification on the network, similar to an email address. 36 Often, users
interact with a network via a wallet, which serves as a primary user
interface. 37
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

PAUL E. CERUZZI, COMPUTING: A CONCISE HISTORY 121 (2012).
DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 47.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 49.
ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING BITCOIN: UNLOCKING DIGITAL
CRYPTOCURRENCIES 65 (2d ed. 2017).
37. Id. at 93. A wallet is software holding cryptocurrency, addresses, and keys.
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Additionally, blockchain networks are typically open source,
meaning the software code necessary for the network’s operation is
publicly available. 38 For example, the Bitcoin network software stack,
Bitcoin Core, is available as open source code and can be run on a wide
array of computing devices. 39 Bitcoin Core is available on GitHub and
is released under an MIT license. 40 The open source nature of blockchain
protocol is important due to the technology’s emphasis on
decentralization. 41 Indeed, the Bitcoin White Paper makes clear there are
no central coordinators who can change the rules of the network. 42
Instead, blockchain networks are described as peer-to-peer.
A peer-to-peer network is a network structure in which all
members have equal privileges and obligations toward one another. 43
The peer-to-peer network developed as a way to solve the double
spending problem, where the same digital coin is spent more than once. 44
For example, the Bitcoin protocol is arguably a peer-to-peer network
using timestamps and a proof-of-work to record a public history of
transactions. 45 The timestamp captures the time of transactions on the
network, while the proof-of-work validates transactions. 46
The blockchain network’s functionality may be understood as a
six-step process. 47 As described in the Bitcoin White Paper, the steps to
run the network are as follows:
1. New transactions are broadcast to all nodes;
2. Each node collects new transactions into a block;
3. Each node works on finding a difficult proof-ofwork for its block;
4. When a node finds a proof-of-work, it broadcasts
the block to all nodes;
38. Id. at 1.
39. Id.
40. Bitcoin Core

integration/staging tree, GITHUB (2019), https://github.com/
bitcoin/bitcoin. See also MIT License, THE OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE (2020),
https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT [https://perma.cc/2V8V-JDHG] (providing text for the
MIT license).
41. Scott J. Shackelford & Steve Myers, Block-by-Block: Leveraging the Power of
Blockchain Technology to Build Trust and Promote Cyber Peace, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 334,
349 (2017).
42. AMMOUS, supra note 7, at 192.
43. Id.
44. Nakamoto, supra note 8, at 8.
45. Id.
46. Shackelford & Myers, supra note 41, at 351.
47. Nakamoto, supra note 8, at 3.
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5. Nodes accept the block only if all transactions in
it are valid and not already spent;
6. Nodes express their acceptance of the block by
working on creating the next block in the chain,
using the hash of the accepted block as the
previous hash. 48
Generally, the idea is nodes consider the longest chain to be the correct
one and will continue working to extend it. 49 Further, the means by which
nodes transact on the network is through a system of Public-Private Key
Cryptography.
B.

Public-Private Key Cryptography

Public-Private Key Cryptography (“PPKC”) is a method for
authentication, relying on a set of mathematically related numbers: a
private key, a public key, and a digital signature. 50 This method
developed to meet the need for a secure key distribution capable of
personal authentication. 51 The key pair consists of a private key derived
from a unique public key. 52 The public key is used to receive funds and
generate an address, while the private key is used to sign transactions to
spend the funds. 53 In essence, the address is shared as a reference point,
and the private key acts as a secret password. 54 A digital signature is an
authentication mechanism enabling the creator of the message to attach a
code, acting as a personal signature. 55
Hash functions are critical to this method of authentication. A
hash function ℎ maps arbitrary strings of data to a fixed length output in
a deterministic, public, pseudo-random manner 56:

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

ℎ ∶ {0,1}∗ → {0,1}𝑑𝑑 .

Id.
Id.
AMMOUS, supra note 7, at 191.
DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 14.
ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 36, at 56.
Id.
DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 15.
Nakamoto, supra note 8, at 8.
Lecture 21: Cryptography: Hashing, MIT Open Courseware (Spring 2015),
https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/electrical-engineering-and-computer-science/6-046j-design-andanalysis-of-algorithms-spring-2015/lecture-notes/MIT6_046JS15_lec21.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4H23-XCMX].
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In essence, hash functions map information for the purpose of
authentication. 57 The public key is hashed to generate an address, 58 while
private key data is hashed to create a digital signature. 59
PPKC enables encrypted messages to be sent without the need for
a shared key. 60 For example, one of the first PPKC systems was the
Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (“RSA”) algorithm. 61 The RSA algorithm
creates a mathematically linked set of public and private keys generated
by multiplying two prime numbers together. 62 While multiplying two
prime numbers is computationally inexpensive, figuring out which prime
numbers were multiplied to get a specific number is computationally
complex. 63 The RSA algorithm took advantage of this mathematical
phenomena, making it possible for people to broadcast a public key while
the private key remained relatively secure. 64 As a result, a sending party
could attach a digital signature to a message by combining the message
with the sending party’s private key. 65
In sum, PPKC allows parties to pseudonymously exchange
messages across a blockchain. 66 Further, blockchains use PPKC to
validate the integrity of data recorded across a distributed ledger. 67 This
process produces digital signatures which represent a sender’s intent to
transfer a message to the receiver. 68 As described by Nakamoto, a
Bitcoin is “a chain of digital signatures.” 69 However, the validation of a
chain of digital signatures allowing secure transactions requires a more

57. BRADLEY N. MILLER & DAVID L. RANUM, PROBLEM SOLVING WITH ALGORITHMS AND
DATA STRUCTURES USING PYTHON 196 (2d ed. 2011).
58. ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 36, at 65.
59. AMMOUS, supra note 7, at 192.
60. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 14.
61. R.L. Rivest et al., A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key
Cryptosystems (Sept. 1, 1977) (unpublished manuscript), https://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/
Rsapaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/J533-5CKP].
62. Id.
63. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 15.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 38.
67. Larissa Lee, New Kids on the Blockchain: How Bitcoin’s Technology Could Reinvent
the Stock Market, 12 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 81, 96 (2016).
68. Shackelford & Myers, supra note 41, at 344.
69. Nakamoto, supra note 8, at 2.
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complex process. Indeed, some scholars claim the key innovation of
blockchain is its ability to process secure transactions. 70
C.

Transactions

U.S. payment, clearing, and settlement (“PCS”) systems process
approximately 600 million transactions per day, valued at over $12.6
trillion. 71 The essential elements of a financial transaction are:
1. A network of participants;
2. An asset or set of assets that are transferred among
those participants; and
3. A transfer process that defines the procedures and
obligations associated with the transaction. 72
At its core, a financial transaction tells a network that the owner
of some value has authorized the transfer of that value to another owner. 73
In other words, transactions are data structures encoding the transfer of
value between participants in a system. 74 While costly financial
institutions have policed such transactions in the past, some argue
blockchain empowers a network of traders to perform this function
itself. 75 Indeed, one of the most interesting aspects of blockchain is that,
in theory, it does not require a central authority to verify transactions. 76
Instead, transactions in a blockchain are bundled into blocks. 77
A block is a data structure that aggregates transactions for inclusion in a
public ledger. 78 Each block consists of a hash value of the previous block,
transactions that occurred in the last ten minutes, and a random integer

70. Edmund Mokhtarian & Alexander Lindgren, Rise of The Crypto Hedge Fund:
Operational Issues and Best Practices for an Emergent Investment Industry, 23 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 112, 155 (2018).
71. Mills et al., supra note 27, at 3.
72. Id. at 5.
73. ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 36, at 18.
74. Id. at 117.
75. Svikhart, supra note 15, at 102.
76. Se-Joon Chung & Euiwoong Lee, In-Depth Analysis of Bitcoin Mining Algorithm
MELLON
UNIV.
1
(2014),
Across
Different
Hardware,
CARNEGIE
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/aa57/bb8e7b27439cdd0f4465fa416d76d17543a3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C4R5-H7EG].
77. Matteo Romiti et al., A Deep Dive into Bitcoin Mining Pools 1 (2019) (unpublished
paper), https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.05999. See also Block Explorer, Blocks, BLOCKCHAIN
(2019), https://www.blockchain.com/explorer [https://perma.cc/M58Z-D7R5] (providing a
lis of the latest blocks with data for popular blockchains).
78. ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 36, at 196.
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called a nonce. 79 Each block is broadcast to the network, presenting a
complex algorithmic problem for validation. 80 Blocks require an
enormous amount of computation to solve, but only a small amount of
computation to verify the solution. 81 Once a block is verified, each
transaction is a recorded public entry in a distributed ledger, the
blockchain. 82 Indeed, every transaction is recorded by every member of
the network so that they all share one common ledger of balances and
transactions. 83
Some argue blockchains make it possible for a person to engage
in transactions without revealing one’s true identity. 84 However,
contextual information related to blockchain-based transactions can be
analyzed to deanonymize individuals. 85 Contrary to conventional
wisdom, which purports that blockchain transactions are processed
instantaneously without any fees, most transactions include transaction
fees. 86 Generally, fees are calculated as the difference between the sum
of the inputs and the sum of the outputs. 87 Any excess amount that
remains after all outputs have been deducted from all inputs is the fee that
is collected by miners. 88
Regardless of fees, the blockchain transactional process is praised
by scholars. One scholar noted “[t]he key innovation of the distributed
computation system was to use global elections every ten minutes,
allowing the decentralized network to arrive at consensus about the state
of transactions.” 89 Another scholar noted that “[p]erhaps Bitcoin’s
greatest technological achievement…is building a peer-to-peer
transaction system relying on cryptographic proof, rather than trust.” 90

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Chung & Lee, supra note 76.
Romiti et al., supra note 77, at 3.
ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 36, at 26.
Id. at 117.
AMMOUS, supra note 7, at 171.
DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 38.
Id. at 39.
See Block Explorer, Average Fee, BLOCKCHAIN.COM, https://www.blockchain.com/
explorer?view=btc_averagefee [https://perma.cc/V37C-HNNS] (last visited Feb. 9, 2020)
(providing data regarding average fees for popular blockchains).
87. ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 36, at 129.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2.
90. Ryan Farell, An Analysis of the Cryptocurrency Industry, U. OF PENN. SCHOLARLY
COMMONS
(May
2015),
https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1133&context=wharton_research_scholars [https://perma.cc/Q6CT-P73P].
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However, blockchain transactions would not be possible without block
validation, 91 which occurs through a process called mining.
D.

Mining

Mining is the process by which blockchain transactions are
validated. 92 Generally, the purpose of mining is to enable network-wide
consensus without a central authority. 93 In Bitcoin protocol, mining
involves solving the SHA-256 hash algorithm, which turns any arbitrary
input into a 256-bit string. 94 In practice, the mining process involves
iteratively hashing a block until a specific target is met. 95 A block does
not become valid until the target is met, when a miner solves the SHA256, producing a proof-of-work. 96
Mining may be defined as a search problem of finding an input,
the nonce, and information from the most recent block that generates a
hash that is less than a target value T, a number considered a valid hash. 97
The probability of mining a block with guesses is given by
(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇⁄2256 ),where r is the hash rate of guesses per second, and t is the
time in seconds. 98 Currently, there is no known efficient algorithm which
can invert SHA-256. 99 As a result, the only way to solve the SHA-256 is
brute force search. 100 In other words, the only way to solve the SHA-256
is by trying different inputs until a satisfactory solution is found. 101
For example, the Bitcoin mining system involves scanning for a
value that, when hashed, produces a hash, ℎ such that (ℎ < 𝑇𝑇), resulting
in a valid proof-of-work. 102 For the Bitcoin network, the proof-of-work
is found with a brute force method which increments a nonce in the block
until a value is found, producing the proof-of-work. 103 The proof-of91. Block validation refers to the process of certifying the legitimacy of transactions
across a blockchain network.
92. ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 36, at 213.
93. Id.
94. Louis Tessler & Tim Byrnes, Bitcoin and Quantum Computing (Nov. 12, 2017)
(unpublished paper), https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.04235 [https://perma.cc/9RA2-SR4A].
95. ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 36, at 228.
96. Id. at 220.
97. Tessler & Byrnes, supra note 94.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 36, at 231.
103. Nakamoto, supra note 8, at 3.
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work scheme ensures transactions are validated by those who are willing
to expend enough physical energy and time to do so while introducing an
incentive to induce market competition. 104
Indeed, miners who solve the SHA-256 for a particular block are
rewarded with digital coins. 105 For example, in the Bitcoin protocol, for
the first four years, each block issued fifty Bitcoins. 106 However, the
number of Bitcoins awarded for solving a block halves every four
years. 107 So, in 2012, the Bitcoin issuance rate dropped to twenty-five
Bitcoins; in 2016, the Bitcoin issuance rate dropped to 12.5 Bitcoins; and
in 2020, the Bitcoin issuance rate dropped to 6.25 Bitcoins. 108 The
number will continue to halve until 21 million Bitcoins have been issued,
which is approximated to occur in the year 2140. 109
However, the reward comes at a cost to miners. Because the
SHA-256 is only solvable by brute force methods, mining requires
substantial electricity and computing power. 110 As a result, miners
collude to form mining pools, where participants work together towards
finding the next block and share rewards based on each miner’s
contribution. 111 Indeed, due to the presence of mining pools in Bitcoin,
the fraction of blocks solved by solo miners has steadily declined and is
considered nearly impossible today. 112 Competition amongst mining
pools is fierce, producing adversarial strategies favoring the pools with
the most computing power. 113 As such, quantum computing 114 will be a
vital element to the future of blockchain security. 115

104. Subhan Nadeem, How Bitcoin Mining Really Works, FREECODECAMP
(May 31, 2018), https://www.freecodecamp.org/news/how-bitcoin-mining-really-works38563ec38c87/ [https://perma.cc/9KJP-Q8HF].
105. Craig Eastland, DAO Prompts SEC to Examine ICOs, 21 NO. 10
WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SEC. ELEC. AGE NL 3 (2017).
106. ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 36, at 215.
107. Lee, supra note 67, at 103.
108. ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 36, at 215.
109. GEORGE GILDER, LIFE AFTER GOOGLE: THE FALL OF BIG DATA AND THE RISE OF THE
BLOCKCHAIN ECONOMY 249 (2018).
110. ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 36, at 26.
111. Romiti et al., supra note 77, at 3.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Quantum computing is a relatively new form of processing harnessing the properties
of quantum mechanics to improve computational efficiency. A detailed description of
quantum computing is provided in Part III.
115. E.O. Kiktenko et al., Quantum-secured Blockchain, 3 QUANTUM SCI. TECHNOL. 1, 2
(June 3, 2018), https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.09258 [https://perma.cc/6TMN-MJHR].
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III. POST-QUANTUM SECURITY
Currently, blockchains are exposed to two prominent postquantum security vulnerabilities. 116 The first vulnerability stems from
exposure of public keys after transactions occur. Once a public key is
exposed, the private key counterpart is at risk of being stolen with
quantum algorithms. 117 The second vulnerability stems from the mining
process itself. In fact, quantum search algorithms have a decisive
mathematical advantage over their classical counterparts. 118 Both
algorithmic vulnerabilities are in large part dependent on the
development of quantum computers, the hardware on which the
algorithms are implemented. 119
A.

Quantum Computing

A quantum computer is a physical system harnessing quantum
effects to perform computation. 120 Quantum computers differ from
classical computers because of the way in which they process
information. 121 Classical computers represent information with “bits,” 122
a binary representation. 123 However, quantum computers process
information with “qubits,” which hold information in a complex vector
space. 124 This mirrors the difference between the physical and classical
states in physics. 125

116. A third vulnerability exists with respect to quantum Boltzmann machines. However,
the research for security applications of quantum Boltzmann machines is not as robustly
developed as Shor’s Algorithm nor Grover’s Algorithm.
117. Killian Steer, Cryptocurrency Mining: The Challenges it Faces and How New
Regulations Can Help, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 301, 322 (2019).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 323.
120. Aleksey K. Fedorov et al., Quantum Computers Put Blockchain Security at Risk, 563
NATURE INT’L J. SCI. 465, 466 (2018).
121. Jacob Biamonte et al., Quantum Machine Learning, NATURE 549, at 5 (2018),
https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.09347 [https://perma.cc/LJ9N-9S2G].
122. A binary representation is a Boolean value, in the context of bits, a 0 or 1.
123. CERUZZI, supra note 28, at 3.
124. ELEANOR G. RIEFFEL & WOLFGANG H. POLAK, QUANTUM COMPUTING: A GENTLE
INTRODUCTION, 14 (2011).
125. LEONARD SUSSKIND & ART FRIEDMAN, QUANTUM MECHANICS, THE THEORETICAL
MINIMUM 2 (2014).
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A qubit is a unit vector in a two-dimensional complex vector
space for which a particular basis, {|0⟩, |1⟩} has been fixed. 126 For
example, |0⟩ and |1⟩ may correspond to the spin-up and spin-down states
of an electron. 127 A qubit may represent a zero, one, or zero and one
simultaneously in a state of superposition. 128 Eleanor Rieffel, the head
of NASA’s Quantum Artificial Intelligence Lab, argues that “the
fundamental unit of computation is no longer the bit, but rather the
quantum bit or qubit.” 129 The goal of quantum computing is to use the
principles of quantum mechanics to improve the efficiency and power of
classical computing methodologies. 130 There are two different types of
quantum computers: adiabatic quantum computers and gate model
quantum computers. 131
1. Adiabatic Quantum Computers
Adiabatic quantum computers (“AQCs”) were developed, and
subsequently patented, in 2006 by Canadian company D-Wave. 132 From
a hardware standpoint, AQCs use liquid nitrogen and liquid helium to
cool a specialized quantum chip to 0.015 Kelvin, a temperature 175 times
colder than interstellar space. 133 Instead of using Silicon like traditional
computer chips, the quantum chips use a metal called Niobium. 134 The
quantum chips contain 2048 qubits in a 16 by 16 cell matrix, with eight
bits per cell. 135 The Niobium is looped throughout the chip, connecting
126. Eleanor Rieffel & Wolfgang Polak, An Introduction to Quantum Computing for NonPhysicists, 32 ACM COMPUTING SURVS., 300, 308 (2000), https://arxiv.org/pdf/quantph/9809016.pdf [https://perma.cc/WV55-7EH2].
127. Id.
128. Peter M. Kogge, Jonathan Baker, Quantum Computing Introduction, UNIV.OF NOTRE
DAME,
CSE
30151
(2017),
https://www3.nd.edu/~kogge/courses/cse30151fa17/Public/Lectures/QC-JMB-edits.pdf [https://perma.cc/CV9R-ZCPG].
129. RIEFFEL & POLAK, supra note 124, at 2.
130. U.S. Patent No. 9,400,499 (July 26, 2016).
131. Ehsan Zahedinejad & Arman Zaribafiyan, Combinatorial Optimization on Gate
Model Quantum Computers: A Survey 1 (2017) (unpublished paper),
https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.05294 [https://perma.cc/B2XM-T4E3].
132. Adiabatic Quantum Computation with Superconducting Qubits, U.S. Patent No.
7,135,701 to Amin et al. (Nov. 14, 2006); see also Quantum Computing with D-Wave
Superconductors, U.S. Patent No. 6,649,929 to Newns et al. (Nov. 18, 2003).
133. NASA ADVANCED SUPERCOMPUTING DIVISION, QUANTUM COMPUTING,
https://www.nas.nasa.gov/projects/quantum.html [https://perma.cc/76RJ-EGAD] (last visited
Feb. 8, 2020).
134. ‘701 Patent, supra note 132.
135. Press Release, D-Wave, D-Wave Breakthrough Demonstrates First Large-Scale
Quantum Simulation of Topological State of Matter (Aug. 22, 2018),
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the qubits and acting as a superconducting metal where each loop models
a quantum spin. 136 And, when cooled to the near-zero Kelvin temperature
at which it is stored, the chip becomes a superconductor, a metal with
properties including zero electrical resistance and magnetic flux fields. 137
This allows the chip to exhibit quantum mechanical effects and to
eliminate noise during the computational process. 138
From a computational perspective, AQCs use the Adiabatic
Theorem, which is composed of two parts: (1) the Ising Model; and (2) a
traverse magnetic field. 139 The Ising Model is traditionally used in
statistical mechanics, where variables are binary and the relationship
between variables is represented by couplings. 140 Additionally, the Ising
Model uses a Hamiltonian energy measurement function to describe the
total amount of energy in a quantum system. 141 The Hamiltonian returns
an energy measurement given the state of a system. 142 The input of the
Hamiltonian function is the state of the system. 143 And the output is the
energy measurement of the system. 144 The Ising Model is defined as
follows: 145
1
𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠 (𝑠𝑠) = − � 𝛥𝛥(𝑠𝑠)𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 + 𝜀𝜀(𝑠𝑠) �− � ℎ𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧 + � 𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧 𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗𝑧𝑧 �
2
𝑖𝑖

𝑖𝑖

𝑖𝑖<𝑗𝑗

Here, 𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠 (𝑠𝑠) is the system’s energy measurement. 146 The Initial
Hamiltonian is defined, �− 12 ∑𝑖𝑖 Δ(𝑠𝑠)𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 �, which is the lowest energy state
https://www.dwavesys.com/press-releases/d-wave-breakthrough-demonstrates-first-largescale-quantum-simulation-topological [https://perma.cc/VH6B-JEYD].
136. ‘929 Patent, supra note 132.
137. Alejandro Perdomo et al., A Study of Heuristic Guesses for Adiabatic Quantum
Computation 5 (Jan. 29, 2010) (unpublished paper), https://arxiv.org/pdf/0807.0354.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RS4Y-VZPN].
138. Id. at 2.
139. Augusto Cesar Lobo et al., Geometry of the Adiabatic Theorem, 33 EUR. J. PHYSICS,
1063 (2012), https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/0143-0807/33/5/1063/meta.
140. Id.
141. Introduction to Quantum Annealing, D-WAVE SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION (2018),
https://docs.dwavesys.com/docs/latest/c_gs_2.html [https://perma.cc/95MR-SCH3].
142. Mohammad H. Amin et al., Quantum Boltzmann Machine 2 (Jan. 8, 2016)
(unpublished paper), https://arxiv.org/abs/1601.02036 [https://perma.cc/NQ8Q-JJ8A].
143. ‘701 Patent, supra note 132.
144. Biamonte et al., supra note 121, at 10.
145. D-WAVE SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION, supra note 141.
146. Id.

2020]

BLOCKCHAIN LEGAL ECONOMICS

133

where all qubits are in a superposition of all states. 147 And, the Final
Hamiltonian is defined, �𝜀𝜀(𝑠𝑠)�− ∑𝑖𝑖 ℎ𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧 + ∑𝑖𝑖<𝑗𝑗 𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧 𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗𝑧𝑧 ��, which is the lowest
energy state for the system. 148 The Hamiltonian is the sum of the Initial
Hamiltonian and the Final Hamiltonian. 149
The second essential element of AQCs is a traverse magnetic
field, which can be manipulated to solve optimization problems. 150
During the computational process, each qubit begins in a state of
superposition encoded in a circular magnetic field. 151 Then, a barrier is
raised, and a magnetic field is applied to the qubits. 152 As the magnetic
field is applied, each qubit moves toward a classical state, ending as a
zero or one. 153 The qubits minimize their energy in the presence of the
magnetic field, according to a bias. 154 Additionally, links between qubits,
called couplers, allow for the resulting states of multiple qubits to affect
one another. 155 A major advantage of the AQC model is its scalability. 156
However, one major drawback is AQCs are incapable of scaling to a
universal quantum computer. 157
2. Gate Model Quantum Computers
The second type of quantum computer is the gate model quantum
computer (“GMQC”). 158 In essence, GMQCs use a circuit model,
replacing classical gates with quantum equivalents. 159 In GCMQs, qubits
are acted upon by sequences of logical gates that are the compiled
representation of an algorithm. 160 The aim is to control and manipulate
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id.
‘701 Patent, supra note 132.
Id.
‘929 Patent, supra note 132.
Biamonte et al., supra note 121, at 8.
‘701 Patent , supra note 132.
Id.
Systems and Methods for Real-Time Quantum Computer-Based Control of Mobile
Systems, U.S. Patent No. 9,400,499 (filed Oct. 2, 2015).
156. Kogge & Baker, supra note 128; see also D-Wave, supra note 135.
157. JOEL M. GOTTLIEB, D-WAVE: INTRODUCTION TO THE PHYSICS OF D-WAVE AND
COMPARISON TO GATE MODEL at 8 (Mar. 20, 2018), https://arcb.csc.ncsu.edu/
~mueller/qc/qc18/readings/gottlieb2.pdf [https://perma.cc/NWE4-2BHC].
158. Multiple-Qubit Wave-Activated Controlled Gate, U.S. Patent No. 9,432,024 (filed
Sept. 2, 2014).
159. GOTTLIEB, supra note 157.
160. Method for Adiabatic Quantum Computing Comprising of Hamiltonian Scaling, U.S.
Patent No. 7,788,192 (filed Jan. 22, 2007).
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the evolution of the quantum states over time. 161 The main advantage of
the GMQC is the potential to scale to a universal quantum computer. 162
A universal quantum computer is a quantum computer that can simulate
any other quantum computer. 163
A “quantum gate” is any quantum state transformation acting on
a small number of qubits. 164 Some sequences of quantum gates are called
“quantum gate arrays” or “quantum circuits.” 165 In quantum information
processing, “gates” are mathematical abstractions used to describe
quantum algorithms. 166 However, quantum gates do not necessarily
correspond to physical objects as they do in the classical case. 167 For
example, the controlled-NOT (“𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ”) gate operates on two qubits as
follows, it changes the second bit if the first bit is one and leaves the bit
unchanged otherwise. 168 The 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 gate is defined as follows 169:
𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = |0⟩〈0|⨂𝐼𝐼 + |1〉⟨1|⨂𝑋𝑋.

Here, 𝐼𝐼 is an identity transformation, 𝑋𝑋 is negation, and ⨂ is the tensor
product. Interestingly, 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is unitary and is its own inverse. 170 The
importance of the 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 gate in quantum computing stems from its ability
to change the entanglement between two qubits. 171
In sum, both AQC and GMQC provide enormous potential for
the future of computing and cryptography. The firms leading the
development of these machines are D-Wave and IBM, respectively. 172 In
fact, both companies have developed substantial research on their
respective hardware architectures. 173 And, developments in quantum
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

D-WAVE SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION, supra note 141 at 29.
GOTTLIEB, supra note 157.
‘192 patent, supra note 160.
RIEFFEL & POLAK, supra note 124, at 74.
Id.
Id. See also Edwin Pednault, et al., Leveraging Secondary Storage to Simulate Deep
54-qubit Sycamore Circuits, CORNELL UNIV. (2019), https://arxiv.org/abs/1910.09534
[https://perma.cc/E4SM-426Y].
167. RIEFFEL & POLAK, supra note 124, at 74.
168. ‘024 Patent, supra note 158.
169. Rieffel, supra note 126, at 20.
170. RIEFFEL & POLAK, supra note 124, at 77.
171. Id.
172. Quantum Computing Applications: A Patent Landscape Report, PATINFORMATICS,
LLC, at 8 (2018), https://patinformatics.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/QuantumApplications-Patent-Landscape-Report-Opt.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QHE-CH9S].
173. Id.
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tomography—which seeks to obtain detailed information about quantum
processors to improve performance—provide meticulous methods for
future developments. 174 Additionally, critical to quantum hardware
research is the development and implementation of quantum
algorithms. 175 A “quantum algorithm” is a set of instructions for solving
a problem, which can be performed on a quantum computer. 176 The early
success of quantum algorithmic research also demonstrates immediate
concerns for blockchain security. 177 Indeed, the application of quantum
algorithms to cryptography exposes security vulnerabilities in blockchain
technology. 178
B.

Elliptic Curve Cryptography and Shor’s Algorithm

Blockchain’s PPKC systems is based on Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (“ECC”). 179 ECC uses the mathematical properties of
elliptic curves over finite fields, which contain a finite number of
elements. 180 The private key is usually picked at random. 181 Then,
elliptic curve multiplication is used to generate a public key from the
private key. 182 The public key is derived by multiplying the private key,
k, by a generator point, g, to get a public key K, (𝑘𝑘 × 𝑔𝑔 = 𝐾𝐾). 183 Because
the generator point is always the same for all Bitcoin users, a private key
multiplied with a generator point will always result in the same public
key. 184

174. Amir Kalev, Anastasios Kyrillidis, Validating and Certifying Stabilizer States 1
(Sept. 3, 2018) (unpublished paper), https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.10786v1 [https://perma.cc/
GZV5-42WK].
175. Biamonte et al., supra note 121; see also Volodymyr Mnih et al., Conditional
Restricted Boltzmann Machines for Structured Output Prediction (2012) (unpublished paper),
https://arxiv.org/abs/1202.3748 [https://perma.cc/6Z4C-6MD8]; Amin, supra note 142.
176. Biamonte et al., supra note 121, at 2.
177. Konstantinos Chalkias et al, Blockchained Post-Quantum Signatures 8 (2018)
(unpublished paper), https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/658.pdf [https://perma.cc/84BE-8MRT].
178. Fedorov et al., supra note 120, at 466.
179. Lee, supra note 67, at 96.
180. I. Stewart et al., Committing to Quantum Resistance: A Slow Defence for Bitcoin
Against a Fast Quantum Computing Attack., 5 R. SOC. OPEN SCI., no. 6, at 3 (June 1, 2018),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.180410 [https://perma.cc/U47R-5KZB].
181. ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 36, at 57.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 63.
184. Id.
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The set of points on an elliptic curve form an abelian group, a
commutative group. 185 The simplest example of an elliptic curve is as
follows:
𝛦𝛦�𝔽𝔽𝑞𝑞 � ∶ 𝑦𝑦 2 = 𝑥𝑥 3 + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏

Here, 𝛦𝛦�𝔽𝔽𝑞𝑞 � is the set of points on 𝛦𝛦 whose coordinates lie in 𝔽𝔽𝑞𝑞 . 186 In
essence, ECC uses a discrete logarithm problem (“DLP”) to protect the
security of public-private key pairs. 187
MIT Professor Peter Shor developed an algorithm solving the
DLP in polynomial time in 1994. 188 In his seminal paper, PolynomialTime Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a
Quantum Computer, Shor describes a solution to the DLP on a GMQC. 189
Shor proposes, given prime number p and a generator g, the discrete
logarithm of a number x is the integer r with 0 ≤ 𝑟𝑟 < 𝑝𝑝 − 1 such that
𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟 ≡ 𝑥𝑥(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝). 190 Shor describes a method for solving DLPs on a
quantum computer with two modular exponentiations and two quantum
Fourier transformations. 191 According to Shor, all that is needed to solve
the DLP on a quantum computer is the order of the generator so that it
can be multiplied and inverted in polynomial time. 192

185. Jeffrey L. Vagle, A Gentle Introduction to Elliptic Curve Cryptography 17
(2000) (unpublishedpaper), https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/jvagle/workingpapers/
A%20Gentle%20Introduction%20to%20Elliptic%20Curve%20Cryptography.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TN58-LLEZ] (explaining that a commutative group describes a collection
of elements in which the result of applying an operation to two group elements does not
depend on order).
186. MIT Open Courseware, Seminar in Algebra and Number Theory: Rational Points on
Elliptic Curves 18.704, MASS. INST. OF TECH. 8 (Fall 2004), https://ocw.mit.edu/
courses/mathematics/18-704-seminar-in-algebra-and-number-theory-rational-points-onelliptic-curves-fall-2004/projects/asarina.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJ8P-TB3V].
187. RIEFFEL & POLAK, supra note 124, at 172.
188. Stewart et al., supra note 180, at 1. (Polynomial time describes the temporal
complexity of algorithms).
189. Peter W. Shor, Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete
Logarithms on a Quantum Computer 20 (Jan. 25, 1996) (unpublished paper),
https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9508027 [https://perma.cc/AEL7-6487].
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 24.
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The crucial ingredient of Shor’s Algorithm is the quantum
Fourier transformation. 193 The quantum Fourier transformation is a
unitary transformation mapping one vector of complex numbers to
another vector of complex numbers. 194 The result is a linear
transformation that maps a quantum state encoding a periodic sequence,
to a quantum state encoding the period of that sequence. 195 Thus, together
Shor’s quantum Fourier transformation and equations for modular
exponentiation allow hackers to derive a blockchain user’s private key
from their public key during transactions. 196
According to a Royal Society Open Science Report, quantum
computers are capable of deducing the private key from a formerly
revealed public key with little effort. 197 The report explains Shor’s
Algorithm provides a viable method of polynomial-time attack against
blockchain’s PPKC system. 198 Another paper, co-authored by NYU
scholars Louis Tessler and Tim Byrnes, explains there is an inherent
vulnerability for pending blockchain transactions due to the use of
ECC. 199 This paper states: “Elliptic curve cryptography is vulnerable to
quantum computing, since Shor’s Algorithm can be easily modified to
decrypt messages sent with elliptic curves, a quantum computer could
then be used to find the private key from a public key.” 200 In essence, an
attacker can compute a private key corresponding to a public key revealed
in the input of a transaction published to the network. 201 Regardless of
how a public key is revealed, the owner is at risk of losing control over
her funds. 202 As a result, reusing addresses is not recommended. 203 In
addition to attacks against individual accounts, quantum computing will
have impacts on the network as a whole, particularly with respect to
mining.
193. Classically, a Fourier transformation is a mathematical function for decomposing
time into frequencies. Fourier transformations are used for breaking down time-based signals
into constituent cycles. See RIEFFEL & POLAK, supra note 124, at 175.
194. Scott Aaronson, Shor, I’ll do it, SHTETL-OPTIMIZED: THE BLOG OF SCOTT AARONSON
(Feb. 24, 2007) https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=208 [https://perma.cc/FB3WDFHV].
195. Id.
196. Fedorov et al., supra note 120, at 466.
197. Stewart et al., supra note 180, at 5.
198. Id.
199. Tessler & Byrnes, supra note 94.
200. Id.
201. Stewart et al., supra note 180, at 5.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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SHA-256 & Grover’s Algorithm

The SHA-256 algorithm is the foundation of blockchain mining.
The SHA-256 is a one-way hash function, which processes any message
of an arbitrary size into a condensed representation called a message
digest. 204 Currently, it is believed there is no efficient algorithm which
can invert SHA-256. 205 As a result, the only way to solve the SHA-256
is brute force search, the process of repetitively trying different inputs
until a satisfactory solution is found. 206 If it were possible to find a
quantum algorithm to invert SHA-256 efficiently, then blockchains could
be mined easily. 207
The SHA-256 uses a sequence of sixty-four constant 32-bit
{256}
words, �𝐾𝐾0{256} , 𝐾𝐾1{256} , ⋯ , 𝐾𝐾63
�, representing the first thirty-two bits on the
fractional parts of the cube roots of the first sixty-four prime numbers. 208
The words are stored as hexadecimal digits, which are binary
representations of a 4-bit string. 209 In sum, SHA-256 uses six logical
functions, where each function operates on 32-bit words, which are
represented as x, y, and z. 210 The SHA-256 is described in two stages,
preprocessing and hash computation. 211
Preprocessing consists of three steps: padding the message,
parsing the message into blocks, and setting the initial hash value. 212 The
purpose of padding is to ensure the message’s length is the appropriate
number of bits. 213 Next, the message and its padding are parsed into 𝑁𝑁
512-bit blocks, �𝑀𝑀(1) , 𝑀𝑀(2) , ⋯ , 𝑀𝑀(𝑁𝑁) �. 214 For SHA-256, the initial hash
value, �𝐻𝐻 (0) �, consists of the eight 32-bit words, in hexadecimal. 215 For
example:
(0)

𝐻𝐻0 = 6𝑎𝑎09𝑒𝑒667
204. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., FIPS PUB 180-4: SECURE HASH STANDARD,
at 3 (Aug. 2015).
205. Tessler & Byrnes, supra note 94.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 204, at 11.
209. Id. at 7.
210. Id. at 10.
211. Id. at 3.
212. Id. at 13.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 14.
215. Id. at 15.
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These words are obtained by taking the first thirty-two bits of the
fractional parts of the square roots of the first eight prime numbers. 216
Next, during the hash computation phase, SHA-256 is used to
hash a message, M, having a length of l bits, where (0 ≤ 𝑙𝑙 ≤ 264 ). The
algorithm uses:
1. a message schedule of sixty-four 32-bit words;
2. eight working variables of 32 bits each; and
3. a hash value of eight 32-bit words. 217
The final result of the SHA-256 is a 256-bit message digest. 218 After
computation, the resulting 256-bit message digest of the message, M,
is 219:
(𝑁𝑁)

𝐻𝐻0

(𝑁𝑁)

∥ 𝐻𝐻1

(𝑁𝑁)

∥ 𝐻𝐻2

(𝑁𝑁)

∥ 𝐻𝐻3

(𝑁𝑁)

∥ 𝐻𝐻4

(𝑁𝑁)

∥ 𝐻𝐻5

(𝑁𝑁)

∥ 𝐻𝐻6

(𝑁𝑁)

∥ 𝐻𝐻7

As illustrated above, the algorithm maintains the 256 bits of hash value
in eight 32-bit variables. 220 In sum, given a message, SHA-256 hashes
the message into a hash value of 256 bits. 221 While the SHA-256 has not
been inverted, a quantum search algorithm provides one way of speeding
up hash rates. 222
Grover’s Algorithm is a quantum search algorithm superior to
any possible classical search algorithm. 223 Indeed, this algorithm
succeeds in finding a solution with 𝛰𝛰�√𝑁𝑁� calls to an oracle, whereas the
best possible classical approaches require 𝛰𝛰(𝑁𝑁) calls. 224 Further,
Grover’s Algorithm uses amplitude amplification to search an
unstructured set of 𝑁𝑁 elements. 225 It is important to note, the algorithm
only offers a speedup on unstructured search problems. 226

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Chung & Lee, supra note 76.
Id.
Kiktenko et al., supra note 115, at 5.
Lov K. Grover, Quantum Computers can Search Arbitrarily Large Databases by a
Single Query, 79 PHYSICAL REV. LETTERS NO. 23, 4709 (Dec. 8, 1997),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/310e/f71fa6f22edfc1dc0d5ae29a0ae43af385ee.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2Y6A-S4XN].
224. RIEFFEL & POLAK, supra note 124, at 177.
225. Id. at 178.
226. Id. at 199.
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1
∑𝑥𝑥 |𝑥𝑥⟩�
The algorithm begins with an equal superposition �|𝜓𝜓⟩ = √𝑁𝑁
of all 𝑁𝑁 values of the search space and repeatedly performs the same
sequence of transformations:
1. Apply 𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝 to |𝜓𝜓⟩.
2. Flip the sign of all basis vectors that represent a
solution.
3. Perform an inversion about the average, a
transformation that maps every amplitude 𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 to
𝐴𝐴 + 𝛿𝛿. 227
The sequence of transformations iterates until the final
measurement returns a value 𝑥𝑥 with a high probability of interest. 228
According to Grover, “[t]he result in this paper is a subtle consequence
of the fact that quantum mechanical amplitudes can be negative, whereas
the associated classical quantities are probabilities which are required to
be positive.” 229 In sum, Grover argues that the result is a demonstration
of another way in which quantum computers can outperform their
classical counterparts. 230
Due to the pseudo-random nature of solving mining blocks,
Grover’s Algorithm provides a method to speed up the mining process. 231
Classically, the success probability of mining a block with guesses is
given by (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇⁄2256 ), where r is the hash rate – guesses per second, and
t is the time in seconds. 232 For a quantum miner running Grover’s
Algorithm, the success probability is:

𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2 �𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞 𝑡𝑡�𝑇𝑇⁄2256 �,

where 𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞 is the number of Grover iterations per second, the quantum hash
rate. 233 Thus, Grover Search 234 provides a quadratic speedup compared
to classical search algorithms. 235

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 178.
Id.
Grover, supra note 223, at 4711.
Id.
Kiktenko et al., supra note 115, at 2.
Tessler & Byrnes, supra note 94.
Id.
Here, “Grover Search” refers to searching via Grover’s Algorithm.
Kiktenko et al., supra note 115, at 5.
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The notorious Bitcoin commentator Craig Wright argues, while
quantum computing may offer a speedup for hashing, current quantum
computational architectures are incapable of running such an
algorithm. 236 However, a Royal Society Open Science report argues that
in a post-quantum world, miners could gain an unfair advantage by
mining blocks using Grover’s Algorithm. 237 The report further explains
once quantum computing reaches a state of development acceptable for
mining, there will likely be quick adoption among the mining
community. 238
At this point, the scale at which Grover’s Algorithm may be
implemented is unclear. A team of researchers from Temple University
implemented Grover’s Algorithm on IBM’s GMQC. 239 The results were
relatively disappointing for the possibility of practical implementations
in the near future, 240 yet some reports and research suggest D-Wave’s
AQC may have the ability to implement quantum cryptographic
algorithms for mining. 241 Ultimately, once the hardware is in place—and
the result of a Grover search is a value, 𝑥𝑥 associated with a hash, ℎ such
that 𝑥𝑥 → ℎ < 𝑇𝑇, where 𝑇𝑇 is the target—quantum cryptography threatens
the integrity of the mining process. 242 In addition to rapidly scaling
security vulnerabilities, major legal and economic regulatory barriers
stand in the way of blockchain becoming a widely accepted or adopted
technology.
IV. LEGAL ECONOMICS
Blockchain law and economics are inherently murky at best. As
markets, blockchains are volatile, with rapid swings in unit value
236. Craig Wright, Bitcoin and Quantum Computing, SSRN (June 29, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3152419
[https://perma.cc/7Q2Q7TEL].
237. Stewart et al., supra note 180, at 4.
238. Id.
239. Aamir Mandviwalla et al, Implementing Grover’s Algorithm on the IBM Quantum
Computer (2018) (unpublished paper), https://cis.temple.edu/~boji/papers/REU2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9722-MJEU].
240. Id.
241. Fedorov et al., supra note 120, at 467; see also Perdomo et al., supra note 137, at 11.
242. Such an association could be modeled with a neural network or quantum Boltzmann
Machine. See Lecture Slideshow, Geoffrey Hinton, Univ. of Toronto, Restricted Boltzmann
Machines
(2013),
https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~hinton/csc2535/notes/lec4new.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L7KR-YQG5] (providing an overview of quantum Boltzmann Machines);
see also ETHEM ALPAYDIN, MACHINE LEARNING 100 (2016) (explaining neural networks).
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happening daily. 243 All the while, cryptocurrency’s legality is similarly
unstable where governments have been slow in adopting regulatory
standards. 244 However, with big risk comes big reward, and blockchain’s
perceived reward potential continues to draw floods of competition to the
digital money market. 245
A.

Cryptocurrency

Cryptocurrency is a digital token, created with blockchain
technology. 246 In the Bitcoin White Paper, Nakamoto defines an
electronic coin as “a chain of digital signatures.” 247 Additionally,
Professor of Economics at Lebanese American University Saifedean
Ammous argues, “Bitcoin is the newest technology to serve the function
of money, solving the problem: how to move economic value across time
and space.” 248 According to Ammous, at its core, money is a good
assuming the role of an accepted medium of exchange. 249 Broadly,
cryptocurrencies are a collection of concepts and technologies forming
the basis of a digital money ecosystem. 250
From an economics perspective, Bitcoin has performed well over
the last two years. Indeed, on August 1, 2017, Bitcoin had a market

243. See Ron Mendoza, Bitcoin Price Finally Hits $8,300, Highest Single-Day Jump in
Five Weeks, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2019) https://www.ibtimes.com/bitcoin-price-finallyhits-8300-highest-single-day-jump-five-weeks-2842133
[https://perma.cc/HBM3-K48H]
(discussing Bitcoin price increase of 4.4 percent in one day, from $7,763.54 to $8,344.12).
244. See generally V. Gerard Comizio, Virtual Currencies: Growing Regulatory
Framework and Challenges in The Emerging Fintech Ecosystem, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 131
(2017); see also China Passes Cryptography Law as Gears Up for Digital Currency, REUTERS
(October 26, 2019) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-lawmaking/china-passescryptography-law-as-gears-up-for-digital-currency-idUSKBN1X600Z
[https://perma.cc/Z7K4-Q8XP].
245. See Aparajita Saxena, JPMorgan Chase to Create Digital Coins Using Blockchain
for Payments, REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2019) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jp-morganblockchain/jpmorgan-chase-to-create-digital-coins-using-blockchain-for-paymentsidUSKCN1Q321P [https://perma.cc/4AUJ-QWDV]; see also Factbox: Fakebook’s
Cryptocurrency Libra and Digital Wallet Calibra, REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2019)
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-cryptocurrency-facts-factbox/factboxfacebooks-cryptocurrency-libra-and-digital-wallet-calibra-idUSKBN1X21Y0
[https://perma.cc/UJ5P-CBUX].
246. Neil Tiwari, The Commodification of Cryptocurrency, 117 MICH. L. REV. 611, 615
(2018).
247. Nakamoto, supra note 8, at 2.
248. AMMOUS, supra note 7, at 1.
249. Id. at 3.
250. ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 36, at 1.
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capitalization of $44.8 billion. 251 Two years later, Bitcoin’s market
capitalization 252 jumped more than 4 times to $185.6 billion. 253 The chart
below graphs Bitcoin’s daily total market capitalization from July 31,
2017 to July 31, 2019:

Figure 1 254

Additionally, the volume of Bitcoin trading across the blockchain
has also seen significant gains over the past two years. 255 The chart below

251. Historical
Data for Bitcoin, COINMARKETCAP (Aug. 14, 2019),
https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitcoin/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190814 [https://perma.cc/85UH-8Z79].
252. Market capitalization refers to the current circulating supply multiplied by unit price.
253. Historical Data for Bitcoin, supra note 251.
254. Id.; see also Brian S. Haney, Bitcoin_Data (2019) (on file with author).
255. Id.
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graphs Bitcoin’s daily trading volumes 256 from July 31, 2017 to July 31,
2019:
Figure 2 257

On August 1, 2017, Bitcoin’s total trading volume, the daily total dollar
value of all Bitcoin network transactions, was $1.32 billion. 258 Two years
later, on August 1, 2019, Bitcoin’s total trading volume skyrocketed to
$17.16 billion. 259 In fact, in the two-year span illustrated in Figure 2,
Bitcoin trading volumes increased by a factor of more than ten. 260
Additionally, the total unit price of single Bitcoin increased from the
August 2, 2017, price of $2,871.30 to $7,769,04 on August 1, 2018, and
then to $10,077.44 on August 1, 2019. 261
However, other cryptocurrencies have not performed as well. For
example, a blockchain called Ethereum has generated minimal gains in
market capitalization over the past two years. Vitalik Buterin, a Russian
Programmer, created Ethereum as an open source blockchain designed to
run a variety of software applications. 262 Ethereum’s blockchain is
tailored for the execution of smart contracts. 263 Smart contracts are selfexecuting computer algorithms manifesting a binding agreement between
parties. 264 Indeed, Ethereum developed a method of creating stages of
execution in a contract within its blockchain, as opposed to Bitcoin’s
binary execution method. 265
Ethereum created its own cryptocurrency to reward its miners
called Ether. 266 The chart below graphs Ethereum’s total market
capitalization from July 31, 2017 to July 31, 2019:

256. Volume refers to the total dollar value of all Bitcoin transactions over a twenty-fourhour period.
257. Haney, supra note 254.
258. Id .
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Eastland, supra note 105.
263. Lee, supra note 67, at 114.
264. Reggie O’Shields, Smart Contracts: Legal Agreements for The Blockchain, 21 N.C.
BANKING INST. 177, 179 (2017); see also Harry Surden, Computable Contracts, 46 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 629 (2012) (Discussing the increasing trend for firms to take a data-driven
approach toward contracts).
265. Lee, supra note 67, at 114.
266. Id.
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Figure 3 267

Ethereum’s market capitalization was $21.2 billion on August 1, 2017
and $23.3 billion on August 1, 2019. 268 Additionally, the total unit price
of a single Ether increased from $204.69 on August 2, 2017, to $433.87
on August 1, 2018, before dropping to $218.55 on August 1, 2019. 269
According to a 2018 Swiss Finance Institute report, the reason for the
significant drop in market capitalization in 2018 for both Bitcoin and
Ethereum is because cryptocurrency is “a highly speculative asset
exhibiting strong bubble activity.” 270 However, there are two distinctions
between Ethereum and Bitcoin cryptocurrency which may account for
Bitcoin’s stronger recovery from the 2018 crash: the rate and the volume
of release. 271 Unlike Bitcoin, Ethereum releases a set rate of 15 million
coins each year and there is no cap to the total number of coins
outstanding. 272 Yet similar to Bitcoin, Ethereum trading volumes have
seen significant growth in the past two years:

267. The information contained in this chart was prepared by the author with information
available at Historical Data for Ethereum, COINMARKETCAP (Aug. 14, 2019),
https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/ethereum/historical-data/?start=20130428&end=
20190814; see also Brian S. Haney, Ethereum_Data [https://perma.cc/85UH-8Z79] (2019)
(on file with author).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. J-C Gerlach et al., Dissection of Bitcoin’s Multiscale Bubble History (Swiss Fin. Inst.,
Working Paper No. 18-30, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3164246 [https://perma.cc/4FKB-FGRN].
271. Lee, supra note 67, at 115.
272. Id.
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Figure 4 273

On August 1, 2017, the total volume of Ethereum trades was $1.58
billion. 274 On August 1, 2019, the total volume of Ethereum trades was
$5.96 billion. 275 During the two-year time frame Bitcoin trading volumes
increased by a factor of ten, Ethereum trades displayed a more modest
increase. 276
To this point, it is relatively clear in terms of both performance
and popularity that Bitcoin is the dominant cryptocurrency. From an
economics perspective the question of whether Bitcoin’s finite amount of
21 million coins will cause it to collapse remains unsolved. 277 Economist
George Gilder argues the finite number of coins is a fatal flaw and
“represents a huge opportunity for other cryptocurrencies.” 278 Others
argue that as Bitcoin’s scarcity increases, the value of Bitcoin as an asset
class will continue to rise. 279 Regardless of Bitcoin’s future performance,
the cryptocurrency market as a whole has evolved at unprecedented
speed. 280 However, questions remain as to both the legality of
273. Historical Data for Ethereum, COINMARKETCAP (Aug. 14, 2019),
https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/ethereum/historical-data/?start=20130428&end=
20190814 [https://perma.cc/2FM9-WSXZ]; see supra Figure 3.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. GILDER, supra note 109, at 256.
278. Id.
279. Kyle Torpey, Here’s the Case For a $100,000 Bitcoin Price By the End of 2021,
FORBES (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ktorpey/2019/08/04/heres-the-casefor-a-100000-bitcoin-price-by-the-end-of-2021/#348f25f128f4
[https://perma.cc/C24H5Y7R].
280. Farell, supra note 90.
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cryptocurrency, and whether the possibilities for regulatory oversight
have the potential to slow growth.
B.

Constitutionality

Ammous argues, “The fundamental scam of modernity is the idea
that government needs to manage the money supply.” 281 Yet, the
Constitution’s Coinage Clause expressly states, “The Congress shall have
Power . . . To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign
Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures.” 282 This power,
read in conjunction with the Appropriations Clause, 283 creates Congress’
power of the purse. 284 According to Yale Law Professor Kate Stith,
“[t]his empowerment of the legislature is at the foundation of our
constitutional order.” 285
Yet, Congress allocates control of the money supply to the
Federal Reserve. 286 The Federal Reserve oversees the country’s
monetary supply, creating money through open market operations. 287 In
The Legal Tender Cases, the Supreme Court made clear “Congress has
the power to incorporate national banks, with the capacity, for their own
profit as well as for the use of the government in its money
transactions.” 288 Further, in Norman v. Baltimore, 289 the Supreme Court
commented on the purpose of the Constitution’s delegation of economic
regulation powers to Congress:
The Constitution was designed to provide the same
currency, having a uniform legal value in all the States.
It was for that reason that the power to regulate the value
of money was conferred upon the federal government,
281. AMMOUS, supra note 7, at 136.
282. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 5.
283. “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations

made by Law…” U.S. CONST. art. I § 9, cl. 7.
284. Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1344 (1988).
285. Id.
286. See Section 2A Monetary Policy Objectives, BD. GOV’S, FED. RESERVE SYS. (2017),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/section2a.htm [https://perma.cc/FU5Y-C3JK];
see also Ali Khan, The Evolution of Money: A Story of Constitutional Nullification, 67 U.
CIN. L. REV. 393, 435 (1999).
287. 12 U.S.C. § 411 (2018).
288. The Legal Tender Cases, 110 U.S. 421, 445 (1884).
289. 24 U.S. § 240 (2018).

148

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 24

while the same power, as well as the power to emit bills
of credit, was withdrawn from the states. 290
In fact, it is difficult to discern any limits to Congress’
constitutional power to regulate the fiscal system. 291 However, the law
makes no distinction between Federal Reserve notes and lawful
money. 292 As a result, the Federal Reserve has the power to create
money. 293
One important question is whether cryptocurrency is considered
money in the same way as the U.S. Dollar. One argument in favor of
cryptocurrency as money is that money is a good assuming the role of a
widely accepted medium of exchange. 294 There is nothing in principle
that stipulates what should be used as money. 295 Thus, the argument
follows cryptocurrency is a medium of exchange and therefore serves the
function of money. 296 If Cryptocurrency is considered money, it could
well be seen as an attempt replace Congress’ power of the purse. 297 In
fact, one scholar suggests blockchain technology could lead to the
disassociation of the State from public power. 298 In such a case,
blockchain could create liability for criminal counterfeiting. 299 If
cryptocurrency is defined as money, it may be considered counterfeit and
rendered illegal because it competes against the dollar as a general
medium of exchange violating the federal money monopoly.300
According to federal law, “Whoever falsely makes, forges, or counterfeits
any coin . . . in actual use and circulation as money within the United
States; Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than fifteen

290. Norman v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 303 (1935) (internal quotations
omitted).
291. Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, The Spending Power, and Federal
Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 24 (2003).
292. Khan, supra note 286, at 439.
293. Id.
294. AMMOUS, supra note 7, at 3.
295. Id. at 4.
296. Id. at 1.
297. See Marcella Atzori, Blockchain Technology and Decentralized Governance: Is the
State Still Necessary (UNIV. COLLEGE OF LONDON, CENTER FOR BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGIES,
2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2709713 [https://perma.cc/Q3VF-ANWH].
298. Id.
299. 18 U.S.C. § 485 (2018); see also 18 U.S.C. § 486 (2019).
300. Eric Engle, Is Bitcoin Rat Poison? Cryptocurrency, Crime, and Counterfeiting
(CCC), 16 J. HIGH TECH L. 340, 367 (2016).
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years, or both.” 301 Under a plain reading of the statute, cryptocurrency is
arguably counterfeit money. 302 Here, the meaning of the word “makes”
spawns one statutory interpretation issue because it is unclear whether
“makes” includes mining or the creation of a blockchain altogether. The
meaning of the word “coin” presents a second statutory interpretation
issue. Indeed, several cryptocurrencies include the word “coin” in their
name, despite the fact that the digital tokens themselves are intangible
sequences of numbers and letters stored in a database. 303 Whether the
anti-counterfeit statute’s definition of “coin” would include
cryptocurrency is another issue in determining the legality of
cryptocurrency.
An argument against cryptocurrency as a form of money is that it
lacks intrinsic value. 304
Proponents of this argument claim
cryptocurrency is only backed by the blockchain, and therefore it is a
purely speculative asset. 305 However, this argument fails for two reasons.
First, all value is subjective rather than intrinsic. 306 Value is a concept
ascribed by people to objects in their environment, not something which
independently emanates from objects. 307 Second, under a cost model
analysis, 308 cryptocurrency is backed by the cost it takes to produce,
which includes labor, computing, and electrical power. 309 So, to say
cryptocurrency isn’t backed by anything is false. In fact, the U.S. Dollar
is a fiat currency, meaning it is not backed by anything and only has value

301. 18 U.S.C. § 485.
302. See William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U.

CHI. L. REV. 539, 541 (2017) (“The plain meaning rule says that otherwise-relevant
information about statutory meaning is forbidden when the statutory text is plain or
unambiguous.”)
303. Global Cryptocurrency and Blockchain Market 2017 By Types (Bitcoin, Ether,
Litecoin, Ripple, Peercoin) Analysis & Growth by 2022, REUTERS PLUS (Oct. 2, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/brandfeatures/venture-capital/article?id=17468 [https://perma.cc/
938G-9T5L].
304. Hossein Nabilou & Andre Prum, Ignorance, Debt and Cryptocurrencies: The Old
and the New in the Law and Economics of Concurrent Currencies, J. FIN. REG., at 7 (2018)
(forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3121918 [https://perma.cc/DQK6-8V6J].
305. Id.
306. See generally ZOLTAN TOREY, THE CONSCIOUS MIND 61 (2014) (Arguing
communication, speech, and thought are only possible where a word stands for a precept of
subjective experience).
307. Id.
308. See Ted Hagelin, A New Method to Value Intellectual Property 30 AIPLA Q.J. 353,
359 (2002) (Explaining cost methods for asset valuation. Cost model valuations are based
upon the amount required to replace an asset).
309. See AMMOUS, supra note 7, at 194.
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because the U.S. Government says it does. 310 One could correctly state
cryptocurrency is not backed by a government, which is probably be
true. 311 The value argument is weak because it implicitly suggests all fiat
currencies are weak as well, relying on subjective evidence and ignoring
cryptocurrency production costs.
In the Bitcoin White Paper, Nakamoto refers to the blockchain
more commonly as a means of solving transactional problems in the
financial system; Nakamoto does not use the term cryptocurrency a single
time. 312 However, b-money—the first source cited in the Bitcoin White
Paper—refers to cryptocurrency as a means by which “anyone can create
money.” 313 Ultimately, whether cryptocurrency is money is merely
subject to the semantics ascribed to the syntax of the words themselves. 314
In large part, arguments either way are wholly based on the way in which
the terms are defined through informal structures of language, falling
victim to the fallacy of equivocation. 315
Ultimately, blockchain technology will certainly challenge the
status quo, conventional law, and economics thinking. 316 Harvard
scholar Edwin Vieira Jr. notes the contemporary consensus seems to be
that the Constitution affirmatively grants the government unlimited
powers over money and banking, and that questioning such an
assumption is an exercise in futility, if not intellectual extremism. 317
Almost certainly this power includes the power to punish developers of
alternative supplies of money or methods of banking. 318 In fact, Ammous
argues, “Government control of money has turned money from being the
reward from producing value to the reward for obedience to government
310. John J. Chung, Money as Simulacrum: The Legal Nature and Reality of Money, 5
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 109, 112 (2009).
311. It is certainly possible for most governments to capture a majority interest in a
blockchain, and, due to the pseudo-anonymity of blockchain technology, it would be possible
to do this conspicuously. For example, the United States government controls billions of
dollars in Bitcoin. See Farell, supra note 90; see also United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F. 3d. 71,
88 (2d Cir. 2017).
312. Nakamoto, supra note 8, at 2.
313. W. Dai, b-money (1998), http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt (discussing
cryptocurrency and government).
314. See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES 11 (1957) (defining syntax
as the study of the principles by which sentences are constructed).
315. See generally TOREY, supra note 306, (arguing words allow the brain to generate
mental experiences through a word-precept framework of cognition).
316. Shackelford & Myers, supra note 41, at 378.
317. Edwin Vieira, Jr., The Forgotten Role of The Constitution in Monetary Law, 2 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 77, 89 (1997).
318. AMMOUS, supra note 7, at 42.
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officials.” 319 Yet, a 2016 Federal Reserve Board report describes
blockchain technology as an “innovation” that will “drive change to the
financial market structure in ways that take advantage of new
technology.” 320 Despite the lack of clarity on blockchain’s legality and
the abstract or digital nature of money, regulation will be an important
part of blockchain’s future.
C.

Economic Regulation

The Constitution states, “The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States
. . . .” 321 Although the Commerce Clause is largely political, under a
plain reading cryptocurrency appears to be within the scope of
Congressional regulatory power because of its role in domestic and global
commerce. 322 Further, the Court explained in Perry v. United States 323
that “[t]here is no question as to the power of the Congress to regulate the
value of money: that is, to establish a monetary system and thus to
determine the currency of the country.” 324 Generally, governments use
their regulatory powers to influence behavior among the population
directly by passing laws that either permit or prohibit conduct. 325 For
example, China has completely banned initial coin offerings 326 as a
method of corporate financing. 327 Governments can also influence
behavior indirectly through economic regulation. 328

Id. at 70.
Mills et al., supra note 27, at 34.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (aggrandizing federal power to
prevent cancer patients from having access to medical marijuana); see also U.S. v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing the substantial effects test places
“virtually no limits” on federal power); see also Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567
U.S. 519 (2012) (finding the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate was a tax within
Congress’s taxing power).
323. 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
324. Id. at 350.
325. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 173.
326. Initial coin offerings (ICOs) are a type of corporate or startup fundraising using
cryptocurrency. Typically, ICOs involve the sale of cryptocurrency tokens in exchange for
legal tender or established cryptocurrency tokens like Bitcoin or Litecoin.
327. Laney Zhang, Regulation of Cryptocurrency: China, THE LAW LIBR. OF CONGRESS
(July 12, 2018), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/china.php (https://perma.cc/
YUA4-CSU5]; see also Eastland, supra note 105 (describing ICO’s as a corporate fundraising
technique involving the exchange of cryptocurrencies).
328. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 174.
319.
320.
321.
322.
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Economic regulation refers to taxes and subsidies, as well as
explicit legislative and administrative controls over rates, entry, and other
facets of economic activity. 329 One theory of economic regulation is
public interest theory. 330 According to this theory, governments supply
regulation in response to the public demand for the correction of
inefficient or inequitable market practice. 331 However, one could argue
persuasively that blockchain is itself a response to public demand for the
correction of inefficient and inequitable government regulation and
control of the money supply. 332 Indeed, some argue it is impractical, if
not impossible, for anyone to develop wealth in government money
without government acceptance. 333
A second theory of economic regulation —capture theory 334—
holds regulation is supplied in response to the demands of interest groups
struggling among themselves to maximize the incomes of their
members. 335 Under this theory, those with the most to lose as a result of
blockchain technology, like transactional lawyers, banks, and financial
institutions, may lobby heavily for regulatory measures to disincentivize
blockchain and cryptocurrencies. 336 This theory cuts to the core of the
United States monetary system, which is based on fiat money. 337 As
Vieira argues, fiat money is unworkable in the long run because fiat
money is a pernicious means of redistributing wealth from society in
general to the wealthy. 338 The argument is well supported by the massive
amount of money the United States government wastes on procurement

329. Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, National Bureau of Economic
Research 1 (NBER, Working Paper No. 41, 1974).
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. AMMOUS, supra note 7, at 136; see also E. Kylie Norman, Note, Banking at the Fed
with FedAccounts: The Demise of Commercial Banks?, 23 N.C. BANKING INST. 451, 458
(2019) (discussing inequality in access to banking and financial services in the United States).
333. AMMOUS, supra note 7, at 70.
334. Posner, supra note 329, at 1.
335. Id.
336. Comizio, supra note 244, at 131 (discussing multi-billion-dollar investments
designed to “disrupt” the financial services industry); see also PETER THIEL, ZERO TO ONE 31
(2014) (claiming the most important thing all firms should do is monopolize a market.
Technologies designed to “disrupt” fail because the word “disruption” is a marketing term
that attracts attention and unwanted competition. As a result, great technologies that dominate
markets often go undetected at first, avoiding competition).
337. Vieira, Jr., supra note 317, at 127.
338. Id.
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every year, which is estimated to be hundreds of billions of dollars. 339 In
fact, the United States spends almost $5 trillion a year on goods and
services, often redistributing public money to the firms and executives
with which agency officials have the closest relationships. 340
There are a myriad of regulatory issues relating to
cryptocurrency, including securities regulation, taxation considerations,
and criminal activity and uses. 341 Indeed, the Federal Reserve states
compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act 342 and anti-money-laundering
requirements as two of its chief concerns relating to the regulation of
blockchain. 343 Additionally, the scope of cryptocurrency as an
investment poses regulatory questions from a securities perspective. 344
For example, the Securities Act of 1933 345 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 346 collectively regulate the disclosure of securities
information to investors. 347 As such, corporate financial compliance with
regulatory oversight will be critical for firms using blockchain
technology. 348
Blockchain’s semi-autonomous nature makes the object of
regulation unclear at best. 349 Indeed, blockchains operate as a network
of people without a defined central or controlling of authority. 350 The
339. Craig Whitlock & Bob Woodward, Pentagon Buries Evidence of $125 Billion in
Bureaucratic Waste, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
investigations/pentagon-buries-evidence-of- 125-billion-in-bureaucratic-waste/2016/12/05/
e0668c76-9af6-11e6-a0ed-ab0774c1eaa5_story.html [https://perma.cc/A49K-EGT2].
340. Lisa Mascaro, Trump Proposes Record Spending, Trillion-Dollar Deficit, FOX BUS.
(Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/trump-proposes-record-spendingtrillion-dollar-deficit [https://perma.cc/D23E-JM4P]; see also Brian S. Haney, Automated
Source Selection Scoring & FAR Compliance, 48 PUB. CONT. L.J. 751, 754 (2019).
341. See generally Jeremy Papp, A Medium of Exchange for an Internet Age: How to
Regulate Bitcoin for the Growth of E-Commerce, 15 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 33 (2014)
(exploring the regulatory landscape surrounding Bitcoin); see also Webb, supra note 25; see
also Benjamin Van Adrichem, Note, Howey Should be Distributing New Cryptocurrencies:
Applying the Howey Test to Mining, Airdropping, Forking, and Initial Coin Offerings, 20
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 388 (2019).
342. Bank Secrecy Act § 121, 12 U.S.C. § 1951 (2018).
343. Mills et al., supra note 27, at 30.
344. Van Adrichem, supra note 341, at 415.
345. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2018).
346. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C § 78a (2018).
347. Daniella Casseres, South Cherry Street, LLC v. Hennessee Group LLC: Investors’
Desperate Plea for Second Circuit Standards, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L 231, 235 (2011).
348. Veronica Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1003,
1010 (2017).
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Money Transmitter Laws, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 529, 529 (2014).
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lack of clarity makes regulation of blockchain technologies a difficult
task. As a result, Primavera De Filippi argues the most direct way
governments can regulate the use of blockchain systems is by imposing
laws and regulations directly on end users. 351 However, this argument
fails to consider the possibility that a government could simply purchase
a majority interest in any blockchain, thereby giving it full control of a
network by taking advantage of the consensus mechanism. 352
Interestingly, Representative David Schweikert (R-A.Z.) is
hopeful for the opportunities blockchain may provide. 353 In fact,
Congressman Schweikert and Representative Jared Polis (D-C.O.) are
the co-chairs of the Congressional Blockchain Caucus, a bipartisan group
that promotes the future of blockchain technology and shapes the role
Congress plays in its development. 354 According to Polis, Congress is
“interested in learning more, and we hope to provide the forum to do
that.” 355 However, President Trump recently tweeted, “I am not a fan of
Bitcoin and other Cryptocurrencies, which are not money, and whose
value is highly volatile and based on thin air . . . .” 356 With the
Government at the heart of the United States economy, there will
certainly be federal involvement in the economic regulation of
cryptocurrency.
V. CONCLUSION
The law and economic questions surrounding blockchain
ultimately relate to the concept of decentralization. At their core,
blockchains are decentralized databases, maintained by distributed
networks of computers. 357 As Richard Posner explains, “technology can
foster decentralization, for example by reducing transaction costs among

351. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 175.
352. Id. at 33.
353. Mike Orcutt, Congress Takes Blockchain 101, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 15, 2017)

[https://perma.cc/53HP-U5LS].
354. Id.; see also Press Release, Rep. Darren Soto Named Co-Chair of the Congressional
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355. Orcutt, supra note 353.
356. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 11, 2019, 5:15 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1149472282584072192?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/JVV8-93F6].
357. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 13.

2020]

BLOCKCHAIN LEGAL ECONOMICS

155

independent firms.” 358 Thus, as a global and decentralized payment
system that operates without centralized control, blockchain technology
promises newfound economic freedom for those dubious of
governmental authority. 359
Decentralization as a concept supposes a movement from a
central authority. 360 In the case of the money supply, that central
authority is the U.S. Government. 361 However, blockchain technology
will not decentralize the economy. 362 The idea of decentralization is
predicated upon blockchain being a peer-to-peer system without a need
for a central authority. 363 Yet, the facilitation of blockchain transactions
requires central authorities and third-party intermediaries who collect
fees. 364 To actually use the blockchain requires a massive amount of
computing power and technical expertise. 365
Thus, rather than
decentralizing the economy, blockchain merely continues to recentralize
the economy toward advanced technology companies. 366
Further, blockchain technology is based on a consensus
mechanism, requiring a majority vote to validate the legitimacy of a
hashed block. 367 Because of Congress’ Power of the Purse, the Federal
Government—or even a large financial institution—could simply
purchase a majority stake in any blockchain. 368 For example, even the
largest blockchain measured by market capitalization, Bitcoin, is only
358. Richard A. Posner, Orwell versus Huxley: Economics, Technology, Privacy, and
Satire 7, (Univ. of Chicago Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No.
89 1999), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=194572 [https://perma.cc/
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PERSPECTIVES_(Oxford Univ. Press, ed. Chris Brummer, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3326244 [https://perma.cc/9YZE-NTZQ] (providing a
comprehensive critique of the term decentralization in reference to blockchain technology).
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worth around $200 billion. 369 While this number may seem large, it is de
minimis compared the roughly $4.7 trillion-dollar proposed 2020 federal
budget. 370
From a security perspective, both Shor’s Algorithm and Grover’s
Algorithm present vulnerabilities in the blockchain. Further, as quantum
computers continue to scale, these vulnerabilities will be increasingly
exploited. 371 Eleanor Rieffel argues once scalable quantum computers
are developed, “all currently accepted public key encryption systems will
be completely insecure.” 372 Additionally, those running the blockchain
will likely begin turning toward quantum computing for mining. 373 And,
as the need for computing power continues to increase, access to
blockchain will continue to decrease for the layman. Ultimately, the
necessity for massive amounts of computing power to run the blockchain
undermines the decentralization argument. 374
Another interesting vulnerability which may become more
prevalent in the context of quantum security is Quantum Boltzmann
Machines. Quantum Boltzmann Machines are a type of quantum
machine learning 375 algorithm capable learning from massive amounts of
data to make predictions about the future. 376 Further, the applications of
Boltzmann Machines continue to grow symbiotically with the
development of quantum hardware. 377 Conceptually, there isn’t any
reason Quantum Boltzmann Machines couldn’t invert the SHA-256
Algorithm. 378 If this were to occur, the mining process would change
369. Haney, supra note 254.
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drastically from its current brute-force method toward predictive
modeling. 379
As technology continues to affect every facet of the globalized
economy, many argue blockchain will be integrally involved in the future
of finance, security, and money. 380 As one recent piece of scholarship
notes, “[t]he widespread use of blockchains will inevitably mean business
disruption.” 381 This line of thinking demonstrates the traditional schools
of thought in technological evolution, specifically the LOAR and
Technological Utopianism. 382 However, there are many barriers to this
result from a technological standpoint.
For example, blockchain technology and cryptocurrency are
incredibly complex. As a result, access is becoming increasingly difficult
as a paywall rises due to knowledge barriers and computational power
needs for mining. Yet, great technology is simple, easy to use, and
intuitive. 383 Indeed, the Latin maxim simplex sigillum veri stands for the
principle—simplicity is the sign of truth. 384 Or, in the words of Richard
Branson, Founder of Virgin Group: “[i]f something can’t be explained on
the back of an envelope, it’s rubbish.” 385
Thus, a challenge exists for blockchain technology to be
simplified and made accessible to the general public. However, for this
to happen, inevitably third-party intermediaries will bridge the gap
between users and the network. 386 Companies like Coinbase offer access
to the blockchain, but they also charge transactional fees in the same way
as financial institutions. 387 The effect of the blockchain is not so much
decentralization, as much as it is recentralization of economic power and
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
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Shackelford & Myers, supra note 41, at 378.
Id.
KURZWEIL, supra note 2, at 250.
Google is arguably the greatest technology of the digital age because it makes the
world’s information easily accessible. All the user must to do operate the Google search
engine is type in keywords representing the topics or categories of information they wish to
retrieve. There is no training, user manual, or quick start guide – it just works.
384. JAMES MORWOOD, OXFORD LATIN DESK DICTIONARY, 174–175 (2005) (defining
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bitcoin-broker-coinbase-booked-1-billion-in-revenue-last-year—so-the-company-has-toldhovering-vcs-to-back-off.html [https://perma.cc/6F9F-43L7] [perma.cc/NX7U-CEN9].
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authority from the federal government to technologically elite companies
with massive amounts of computing power. More broadly, technology is
not a means by which the economic pyramid diffuses toward a
democratized equilibrium. 388 Rather, technology is a business supporting
the redistribution of wealth from poor and middle class, to an elite ruling
class.
In sum, blockchain is simply an example of technological
stagnation.
The underlying technology involved in blockchain
transactions is not a paragon of innovation. As Peter Thiel argues: “[w]e
must resist the temptation of technological utopianism—the notion that
technology has a momentum or will of its own, that it will guarantee a
more free future, and therefore that we can ignore the terrible arc of the
political in our world.” 389 With the assumptions of technological
utopianism aside, blockchain is nothing more than an overly complex and
expensive method of sending information. The only economic benefits
of blockchain technology to this point are the advantages reaped in its
early evasion of government economic regulation, but that advantage is
rapidly changing. 390 In the words of Warren Buffet, blockchain is more
likely “rat poison squared” than breakthrough technology. 391 Thus,
Satoshi Nakamoto’s goal of establishing a peer-to-peer network appears
to be a failure, but it surely made them rich.
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APPENDIX A. SUMMARY OF NOTATION
Notation

Meaning
Hash.

ℎ

{0,1}∗

{0,1}𝑑𝑑

Arbitrary string of data.
Fixed length string of data.

𝑇𝑇

Target value.

𝑡𝑡

Time in seconds.

Hash rate.

𝑟𝑟

𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠 (𝑠𝑠)

1
− � Δ(𝑠𝑠)𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥
2
𝑖𝑖

𝜀𝜀(𝑠𝑠) �− � ℎ𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧
𝑖𝑖

𝜎𝜎 𝑧𝑧

+ � 𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧 𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗𝑧𝑧 �
𝑖𝑖<𝑗𝑗

The energy of system.
The Initial Hamiltonian.

The Final Hamiltonian.

Pauli matrices.

𝐼𝐼

Identity transformation.

⨂

Tensor product.

𝑋𝑋

Negation.

|𝑥𝑥⟩⟨𝑦𝑦|

The outer product of |𝑥𝑥⟩ and ⟨𝑦𝑦|.

𝛦𝛦�𝔽𝔽𝑞𝑞 �
p

The set of points on 𝛦𝛦.

g

Generator.

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝

{256}

𝐾𝐾𝑛𝑛

𝑀𝑀(𝑁𝑁)

Modulo prime number 𝑝𝑝.
Prime number.

Constant 32-bit word.
512-bit block.
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𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖

(0)

Initial hash value.

(𝑁𝑁)

Final hash value.

𝛰𝛰(𝑁𝑁)

Linear time.

𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖

|𝜓𝜓⟩

Superposition.

𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝

Quantum Oracle.

𝛿𝛿

Shift.

𝐴𝐴

𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2
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The average of the amplitudes.

The composite of the square function
and the sine function.

